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                                                  Abstract  
Market regulators around the world are still debating whether or not high-frequency trading 
(HFT) plays a positive or negative role in market quality. We develop an artificial futures 
market populated with high-frequency traders (HFTs) and institutional traders using Strongly 
Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) trading algorithm. We simulate real-life futures trading 
at the millisecond timeframe by applying STGP to E-Mini S&P 500 data stamped at the 
millisecond interval. A direct forecasting comparison between HFTs and institutional traders 
indicate the superiority of the former. We observe that the negative implications of high-
frequency trading in futures markets can be mitigated by introducing a minimum resting 
trading period of less than 50 milliseconds. Overall, we contribute to the e-commerce 
literature by showing that minimum resting trading order period of less than 50 milliseconds 
could lead to HFTs facing a queuing risk resulting in a less harmful market quality effect. 
One practical implication of our study is that we demonstrate that market regulators and/ r e-
commerce practitioners can apply artificial intelligence tools such as STGP to condu t 
trading behaviour-based profiling. This can be used to detect the occurrence of new HFT 
strategies and examine their impact on the futures market. 
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Introduction  
Today’s trading in futures markets is more complex and often involves little human 
intervention. The dramatic increase in the variety of trading platforms combined w th 
significant technological advancements, makes the process by which trading orders are 
processed and executed much more complex than it was ten years ago. Significant 
technological investments resulted in latency improvements, where computer algorithms 
execute trading orders based on electronically received information before human traders. 
Speed races in today’s trading are occurring even at nanosecond (billionths of a second) 
intervals [6]. High-frequency traders (HFTs) are able to anticipate future trading order flows 
because they process intraday trading messages faster than other market participants [16]. 
Several studies highlight that such anticipatory or front-running trading generates negative 
externalities, such as limited liquidity provision, forcing other slower market participants to 
abandon trading, or facilitating overinvestments i  technological bases [3, 18, 21, 34].  
However, most studies on the topic are lacking the ability to identify which trades an  quotes 
come from HFT. This research obstacle makes it difficult to investigate how HFT affects the 
market and other market participants [14, 20, 24]. This is due to the fact that no publicly 
available dataset, including NASDAQ 120, allows researchers to directly identify all HFT 
[2]. Egginton et al. [14] argues that it is hardly possible to identify orders generated by 
computer algorithms in the U.S. equities markets and all previous studies used proxies to 
measure the level of algorithmic trading and HFT1.  o investigate the implications of HFT 
on market efficiency, most of the extant research up to date proceeds after somehow 
identifying via proxy measures or a combination of variables such as trading volume, 
cancellations, inventory turnover and order-to execution ratios the trades generated by HFTs 
                                                          
1 Frino et al. [19] use several proxies to identify algorithmic trading in futures markets.  
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[16]. Moreover, the huge number of variables and very complicated cause-effect relationships 
among these variables and potential outcomes imposes another research obstacle [15].  
In contrast, this study uses a special adaptive form of the Strongly Typed Genetic 
Programming (STGP) and millisecond data of E-Mini S&P 500 to demonstrate how HFTs 
front-run other market participants’ orders and generate significant trading profits. There are 
several reasons for selecting the E-Mini S&P 500. On the one hand, this particular financial 
instrument is the world’s most actively traded stock index futures contract, with over 2.2 
million contracts traded per day [17].  
In addition, Baron et al. [2] suggest that the E-Mini S&P 500 is a favourable setting for 
examining HFT because this is a highly liquid market with a high number of HFT companies 
regularly trading. Moreover, this particular financial instrument is only traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, and there is no concern about unobserved trading orders executed on 
other trading venues.  
The STGP (described in Appendix A) is an extremely suitable sophisticated trading algorithm 
that successfully replicates HFT scalping strategies. While, Dunis et al. [13] suggest hat 
Genetic Programming (GP) models perform remarkably well evn in simple trading 
exercises, Paddrik et al. [38] report that a zero-intelligence agent-based model of the E-Mini 
S&P 500 futures market enables close examination of the market microstructure2.  Östermark 
[37] suggests that genetic algorithms provide a powerful supplement to traditional 
econometric techniques, while Chatterjee et al. [8] notes that many statistical and 
mathematical restrictions can be avoided by employing genetic algorithms. Lensberg et al. 
                                                          
2 While Python and Java programming languages are suitable for trading at the minute timeframe, C++, ASIC 
and FPGA languages are appropriate for trading at the very low latencies of microseconds and nanoseconds. 
Machine learning languages such as Genetic Programming, Strongly Typed Genetic Programming and Genetic 
Algorithms are appropriate for trading signal research and statistical analysis. All of these programming 
languages are interconnected in HFT.   
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[29] suggest that GP is extremely powerful financial tool which minimises the amount of a 
priory structure associated with traditional functional forms and statistical selection 
procedures. Mendes et al. [33] employ GP in the foreign exchange market to achieve positive 
forecasting results. More recently, Chen and Wang [9] point out that GP has the advantage of 
systematic random search and derivative-free optimisation. We reproduce the HFT scalping 
strategies in an artificial futures market environment where the impact of these strategies can 
be examined and new regulations can be evaluated to maintain the overall health of the 
financial system.  Using STGP, we replicate the interactions between HFTs and institutional 
traders and compare their performance under the same underlying trading order stream . In 
other words, we replicate r al-life futures trading sessions which allow us to avoid the 
obstacles in the studies discussed above.   
Our empirical findings have important implications for market regulators, academics and the 
general public. To summarise, the contribution of this study is two-fold.  
First, this is the first study to use an innovative trading algorithm and millisecond data to 
provide empirical evidence of how HFT front-running scalping strategies operate in futures 
markets, imposing discriminatory disadvantages on other market participants. We observe 
that HFTs frequently cancel recently placed orders from around the best quotes leading to a 
substantial reduction in the certainty of execution prices making prices more transient. 
Moreover, the process of placing a large number of trading orders in a short time span creates 
a false sense of the supply and demand for the E-Mini S&P 500 and hence adversely impacts 
market quality.  Second, we estimate in precise quantitative terms the daily profits of HFT, 
providing an advantage over existent studies, such as tat of Brogaard [4] which observed 
HFT activities in the aggregate data only, thus preventing them from calculating the exact 
profitability of HFT. We also propose new regulatory measure such as  minimum resting 
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trading order period of less than 50 milliseconds to mitigate the negative consequences of 
HFT scalping strategies in futures markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 comprises of th  
literature review, while Section 3 presents the experimental design of the artificial futures 
market and data utilised in this study. Section 4, reports the artificial agents’ trading activity 
and profitability, while Section 5 presents the conclusion. Additional clarifying and technical 
material can be found in Appendices A and B.  
Related literature 
Brunnermeier and Ped rsen [5] show that front-running of trading orders leads to price 
‘overshooting’ and amplifies a large trader’s liquidation cost and default risk. Moreover, 
front-running trading strategies make the market illiquid when liquidity is most needed. More 
recently, Baron et al. [2] estimates that HFTs collectively accumulate over $23 million in 
trading profits in the E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract during August 2010. Hirschey [24] 
uses a year of the trader-l vel data from the NASDAQ to examine return and trade patterns 
around periods of aggressive buying and selling by HFTs. The author demonstrates that HFTs 
earn profits by identifying patterns in trade and order data that actually allow them to front-
run the order flow and trade ahead of other market participants. Li [ 30] attempts to model the 
front-running HFTs and show that they effectively levy a speed tax on traditional traders, 
making markets less liquid and prices ultimately less informative. Moreover, when infinitely 
front-running HFTs compete, their negative implications on market quality persist and such 
negative implications are more severe when HFTs possess more heterogeneous speeds. In 
another computational experiment Leal et al. [28] build an agent-based model to analyse the 
interplay between low-and high-frequency trading and its implications on market dynamics. 
On the one hand, the authors observe that an increase in trading or er cancellations leads to 
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higher volatility levels and more intense flash crashes. On the other hand, they also lead to 
faster price-recoveries which reduce the duration of flash crashes.  
Egginton et al. [14] examine all trades and quotes for NYSE and NASDAQ listed stocks for 
all trading days in 2010 and suggested that order cancellation is a pervasive process with 
several hundred events occurring during a trading day. They argue that during periods of 
intense order cancellation financial instruments experience decreased liquidity, higher trading 
costs and increased short-term volatility.  
Sun et al. [40] use tick level data of 105 stocks in the US market from January 2008 to 
October 2010 to show that HFT can reduce excution costs when supplying liquidity. 
Jarnecic and Snape [25] analyse the order submission strategies by HFTs and traditional 
traders in the limit order book by using the sample period from April 1, 2009 to June 30, 
2009 for FTSE-100 stocks and confirm our empirical results.  Their evaluations suggest that 
HFTs cancel orders of all durations from around the best quotes, thereby reducing the 
certainty of execution prices and making trading more difficult for non-HFT participants, by 
making prices more transient. Similarly, Han et al. [21] construct a simple model of market 
making in which high-frequency market makers rapidly cancel orders after receiving an 
adverse signal and observed that low frequency market makers widen the bid-ask spreds, 
thus leading to liquidity erosion.  
In a recent study, Fishe et al. [16] use WTI crude oil futures contract traded on the 
CME/Nymex exchange from September to December, 2011 to investigate whether there is a 
class of market participants who follow strategies that appear to anticipate locl price trends. 
The authors demonstrate that there are anticipatory traders capable of processing information 
prior to the overall market and systematically act before other participants. Kumaresan and 
Krejic [27] examine the trading trajectories for atomic orders in an environment consisting of 
8 | P a g e  
 
several trading venues and carry out an optimization procedure to find the most optimal rder 
placement solution for algorithmic trading orders. Although the authors claim th t this is a 
significant computational breakthrough, they implement execution window measured in 
minutes, which does not seems to correspond with real-lif  HFT. In contrast to all other 
studies on the topic which typically rely on econometric tests only, we use an innovatve 
STGP trading algorithm and millisecond data to demonstrate how HFT front-running 
scalping strategies operate in practice.  
 
Experimental design. 
Twenty years ago, the process in which financial instruments were traded was of simple nature: 
an investor deciding to buy or sell and transmitted this information to a broker, who then sends 
the order to an exchange, where bid and ask orders were matched and executed. All market 
participants had access to the same information about the bid-ask spread.  
Today’s brokers use trading algorithms to route different segments of an order to different 
exchanges at super human speed of milliseconds, microseconds and even nanoseconds. 
We use a special adaptive form of the Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP), which 
enables us to choose and adjust different parameters to suit our specification, such as the 
minimum price increment, number of participants and their wealth, the level of transactio  
costs, and differing trading preferences. The exact number of evolutionary parameters that we 
can specify is listed in Table 1.We create simulated futures market, which is a hypothetical 
market with real-world market price data.  Each market participant in our experiment 
represents an artificial trader who is equipped with their own trading rule, where the selection 
of the best performing traders and the production of the new genomes is conducted through the 
recombination of the parent genomes by crossover and mutation operations, which are further 
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elaborated in Appendix A. The main idea is that the trader’s trading rule will improve by a 
natural selection process based on the survival of the fittest [31]. Hence, the evolutionary nature 
of the trading process and price dynamics enable the artificial traders to recogniz , learn and 
exploit profit opportunities while continually adapting to the changing market conditions.  
Consequently, STGP trading algorithm evolves the model step-by-step by feeding it with 
millisecond quotes the E-Mini S&P 500, and therefore the forecasting models evolve 
mimicking the real- ife futures market.  
 
The process of developing trading rules 
Initially, each individual trader has only one trading rule which is created randomly which 
enables the whole range of possible trading rules to be studied. To create later g nerations, we 
apply the crossover recombination technique and mutation operation, where the crossover 
recombination technique randomly chooses parts of two trading rules to exchange in order to 
create two new trading rules, and the mutation operation randomly changes a small part of a 
trading rule.  This process is repeated until at least one trading rule in the population achieves 
the desired level of fitness, measured by a trader’s investment return over a sp cified period. It 
should be noted that this initial random nature can result in the creation of meaninglss trading 
rules or trading rules which cannot be evaluation thoroughly since they do not return the value 
that function needs.  Nevertheless, as Montana [35] notes, these programming issues can be 
resolved by the introduction of STGP, where the process requires the definition of a specific
set to fit the problem. 
Each trading rule in our artificial futures market setting take historical millisecond prices of the 
E-Mini S&P 500 and generate advice which consists of the desired position which is estimated 
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as a percentage of the trader’s wealth and an order limit price for buying  and sellig the 
financial instrument3.   
The trading rules logic comprises of information on price and volume, minimum, maximum 
and average functions related to millisecond price and trading volume data, and different 
logical and comparison operators.  In the conventional Genetic Programming (GP) procedure, 
trading rules are evaluated by the same fitness function in each generation.  In contrasts, the 
STGP evaluates the fitness of traders through a dynamic fitness function, which enables the 
return estimation period to move forward and include the most recent quotes in the markets.  
Sermpinis et al. [39] notes that having a novel fitness function is crucial in financial modelling, 
where statistical accuracy does not always correspond to financial profitability of the deriving 
forecasts. Also, while the GP replaces the entire genetic population through crossover and 
mutation techniques at a time, STGP only replaces a small proportion of the entire population 
which ensures a gradual change in population and thus greater model stability [31].   
Another important feature of the STGP is that each trader discovers the intri sic value of the 
E-Mini S&P 500 individually without any communication between traders, ensuring 
individuality and that the level of intelligence of each artificial trader is not affected by other 
traders. This allows the development of more meaningful trading rules for both HFTs and 
institutional traders.  
  
Structure of the artificial futures  market and the differences between HFTs and 
institutional traders .  
We examine HFT front-running scalping strategies within the context of artificial futures 
market populated by 100,000 boundedly rational traders. All artificial traders in the model are 
                                                          
3 This process is further explained in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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not orientated towards a predetermined formation of strategies and therefore are f ee to 
develop and continually evolve new and better trading rules through time.  Our artificial 
futures market is populated by 80,000 institutional traders and 20,000 HFTs (20 per cent of 
the total population based on the continuous Breeding Fitness Return).  
Both HFTs and institutional traders trading rules are created using STGP programming 
technique explained in Appendix A. However, the main difference between the two trading 
groups is that the HFTs’ group consists of the traders that momentarily perform best in terms 
of the continuous Breeding Fitness Return, and therefore they possess lower latency.
Although the institutional traders and HFTs both observe the same millisecond data of the E-
Mini S&P 500 and generate trading orders, HFTs are able to access and process the data first 
due to their low latency features. In other words, HFTs are able to foresee the quotes of heE-
Mini S&P 500 and submit trading orders before institutional traders. The Breeding Fitness 
Return is a trailing return of a wealth moving average which determines the fitness rul  of 
traders. This return is calculated over the last n quotes of data of an exponential moving 
average of traders’ wealth, where n is set to the minimum breeding age with a maximum of 
250. In the case where the age is less than n, no value is calculated. This particular type of 
return is used to measure the fitness criterion for the selection of traders to breed.  
Breeding is, in essence, a process of creating new artificial traders to replace poor performing 
ones based on the values derived from Equation (1) below. Both HFTs and institutional 
traders operate in the same market and accumulate wealth by investing in two financial 
instruments that are available in the artificial stock market – the risky E-Mini S&P 500 and 
the risk-free instrument represented by cash. Because our artificial futures market 
continuously evolve, traders with trading rules that perform well become wealthier, positively 
influencing the forecasting accuracy of the model. In each period, an artifici l rader has 
wealth given by the following formula: 
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௜ܹ,௧ = ௜,௧ܯ + ௧݄ܲ௜,௧ (1) 
where ܹ ௜,௧ is the wealth accumulated by trader ݅ in period ܯ ;ݐ௜,௧ and ݄ ௜,௧ represents the 
money and the amount of the E-Mini S&P 500 held by artificial trader ݅ respectively, in 
period ݐ, and ௧ܲ is the price of the E-Mini S&P 500 in period ݐ. 
 
 
The clearing mechanism and order generation for the artificial futures market.  
Our artificial futures market is a simulated double auction market, where all the buy and sell 
orders are collected.  The artificial traders receive historical quotes of the E-Mini S&P 500 
and evaluate their trading rule and subsequently calculate the number of contracts they need 
to buy or sell. If contracts need to be bought or sold, an order is generated to buy or sell the 
required amount determined by the specified limit price.  For example, if a trader holds 1,000 
contracts of the E-Mini S&P 500 which is priced at $38.50 and has $80,000 in cash, their 
wealth is $118,500 and their position in E-Mini S&P 500 is 32.5%. If the trading rule 
generates a signal of a position of 50% and a limit price of $38.50, the limit order will be 
produced to purchase 5394 additional E-Mini S&P 500 contracts with a price of $38.50. The 
artificial futures market hen calculate the clearing price and all trading orders are executed at 
the clearing price which is where the highest trading volume from limit orders can be 
matched.   
In cases when the clearing price can be matched at multiple price levels, then the claring 
price is the average of the lowest and highest of those prices.  The number of contracts 
purchased by traders is always equal to the number sold by other traders and if the number of 
                                                          
4 50% * (118,500/38.50) – 1000 = 539 contracts. 
13 | P a g e  
 
contracts offered and the number of contracts asked are not equal, the remaining orders will 
be partially executed.  Therefore the orders at the clearing price will be selected for execution 
with priority for market orders over limit orders, and then on a first-in first-out (FIFO) basis.  
In the unlikely event of no matching limit orders, no market orders are executed and the 
artificial futures market price will be the price of the previous quote [31]. As in real-life E-
mini market, there is no designated market maker and there are no short-selling constraints.  
 
Description of data and transaction costs.  
The dataset used in this study consist of real-life millisecond data of the E-Mini S&P 500 
from February, 2014 to December, 2014. We obtained the data from Nanex 
(www.nanex.net). We only select the front-month dataset for each month – the contract with 
the nearest expiration date. The E-Mini S&P 500 expirations months are March, 2014; June, 
2014; September, 2014; and December, 2014. For empirical investigation we focus on 
February, 2014, which has a March, 2014 expiration; May, 2014, which has a June, 2014 
expiration; August, 2014, which has a September, 2014 expiration and November, 2014, 
which has a December, 2014 expiration. This allows us to exclude months in which the 
leading contract expires in order to eliminate the rollover effect. Although the E-Mini S&P 
500 trades virtually round the clock, we only consider millisecond data during regular market 
hours when the markets of the underlying equities of the S&P index are open and before the 
daily halt in trading: weekdays from 8:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. Central Standard Time (CST). 
Each contract has a multiplier of $50 times the value of the underlying S&P 500 index, and 
therefore a contract with an index value of 1,000 suggest that the futures contract is valued at 
$50,000. The tick size in E-Mini S&P 500 is 0.25 index points. Hence, considering the $50 
multiplier, a one tick change is equal to $12.50.  
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The STGP trading algorithm processed 18,655,490 trading messages stamped at the 
millisecond interval for the E-Mini S&P 500 in February, 2014; 22,878,525 trading messages 
in May, 2014; 27,368,175 trading messages in August, 2014; and 16,282,009 trading 
messages in November, 2014.   
Baron et al. [2] report that the cost of exchange fees per contract is $0.155. We employ 
transaction costs of $0.20 per contract for our profit calculations. Although slightly higher 
than the current standards, the level of transaction costs takes into account the costs of HFT 
companies. These include software platforms, labour and risk management systems but does 
not include co-location of services (Aitken et al.[1] argue that the presence of HFT leads to 
the introduction of co-location services).  
 
Experimental results 
Traders’ activity on artificial futures market.   
The aim of this section is to investigate artificial traders’ activity on our futures market, 
which has been designed to run in parallel with real-life futures market. All empirical tests 
below are based on data generated by the STGP trading algorithm for HFTs and institutional 
traders. 
First, we examine what happens to the limit orders of the E-Mini S&P 500 after they are 
submitted to the artificial futures market. Let ߬ denote the time between order submission and 
cancellation. The probability of cancellation in the interval (0,  is represented by the [ݐ
distribution function: 
                                                          
5 The E-Mini S&P 500 futures market does not involve marker – taker transaction costs unlike most equity 
markets.  
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஼ܲ௔௡௖௘௟(ݐ) = Pr (߬ ൑  (2) (ݐ
We extract all trading activity generated by the STGP trading algorithm for the E-Mini S&P 
500 to estimate the distribution function using the life-table method, and taking execution as 
the censoring event. In contrast to all other studies we are able to observe and count the 
number of executed and cancelled orders by extracting generated data from the STGP trading 
algorithm. 
Table 2 shows that a large number of limit orders submitted by HFTs are cancelled almost 
immediately after submission. Table 2 reports that, ஼ܲ௔௡௖௘௟(50), the probability of 
cancellation within 50 milliseconds is 0.918. By the time 500 milliseconds have lapsed, this 
probability dramatically decreases to 0.056. At the same time the probability of cancellation 
for institutional traders measured at 50 milliseconds is 0.001 increasing to 0.028 at 500 
milliseconds. A comparison of cancelled orders by HFTs and institutional traders indicates 
that HFTs cancel substantially larger proportion of orders after a very short duration. The 
extremely high level of cancelled orders indicates the high level of aggressiveness of HFTs in 
exploiting the orders placed by institutional traders on the artificial futures market. This is 
consistent with Hasbrouck and Saar [22] who suggests that over one third of limit orders are 
cancelled within two seconds by HFTs.  
In addition, Leal et al. [28] highlight that this type of empirical results stimulates the 
occurrence of high bid-ask spreads in the market, thus increasing the likelihood of a 
significant decrease in the price of any financial instrument. A direct comparison between 
cancelled and executed orders indicates that execution seems the less probable event for all 
time intervals. Furthermore, Jarnecic and Snape [25] report that short duration orders 
contribute to the difficulty of trading by non-HFT participants by lifting quotes and inhibiting 
the certainty of long-term investors when attempting to demand liquidity. This finding 
motivates us to examine the exact location of short duration orders to find out whether HFTs 
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operate with those orders inside the spread. This type of analysis is important due to the fact 
that frequent removal of orders located within the spread can reduce the certainty of the 
execution price for institutional traders trying to demand liquidity.  
Table 3 report that order cancelations are present inside or at the best quotes, and this finding 
is substantially more pronounced for HFTs measured up to 50 milliseconds. HFTs generate 
71.24% of order cancellations within the quoted prices, and a further 18.49% at the best 
quotes. The empirical results in Table 4 reveals that for orders that are cancelled with greater 
than 50 millisecond frequency, the percentage for orders cancelled by HFTs decreases to 
63.28% inside the best price and a further 15.01% at the best quote. We observe the opposite 
trend with institutional traders.  
They increase the amount of cancelled limit orders within the best quote from 8.10% 
measured up to 50 milliseconds to 12.53% with frequencies greater than 50 milliseconds. 
These findings indicate that HFTs frequently cancel trading orders of different durations but 
more often cancel recently placed orders from around the best quotes. As a result, the 
certainty of execution prices has been substantially reduced making prices more transient and 
imposing trading obstacles for non-HFT participants. Moreover, frequent order cancellation 
creates a false sense of supply and demand for the E-Mini S&P 500. By quickly cancelling a 
large number of orders within the 50 millisecond interval, HFTs could create potentially 
exploitable latency arbitrage opportunities.  
Budish et al. [6] report that there are about 800 such arbitrage opportunities per day in the 
two largest securities that track the S&P 500 index alone – the E-Mini S&P 500 and the 
iShares SPDR S&P 500 exchange traded fund, totalling $75 million per year.  
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Traders’ profitability  in artificial futures market .   
The aim of this section is to measure the level of profitability of artificial traders oprating in 
futures markets. All empirical tests below are based on data generated by the STGP trading 
algorithm for HFTs and institutional traders. 
One of the most important characteristics of high frequency millisecond data is the high 
presence of no price changes in the E-Mini S&P 500. We take into account this market 
inactivity by modifying the Student’s t distribution associated with the standardized residuals: 
݂ ർא௧ߪ௧ ቚߜ௧඀ = ௧ߜ ଴  if݌} = 1 (3) 
                                                                            Or 
݂ ർא௧ߪ௧ ቚߜ௧඀ = ൜݃௩(א೟/ఙ೟)1 െ ଴݌  if ߜ௧ = 0 (4) 
where ݃ ௩(௚) measure the Student’s density function; א௧ represents the residuals of the time 
series; ߪ௧ is the standard deviation of the time series; ݌଴ represents the probability of a 
sequence of two zero returns; ߜ௧ measure market inactivity as follows: 
௧ߜ = ቄ10   if, otherwise (5) 
If ௧ߜ  = 1, the forecast ݔ௧ା௜|௧ = 0 for ݅ =  .[32] ڮ1,2
Given the large amount of millisecond trading messages, an important issue that arises is th  
Lindley’s paradox. This phenomenon can potentially lead to overstatement of statistical 
significance and a tendency to reject the null hypothesis even when the posterior odds favour 
the null.  
Connolly [10] proposes the following equation to overcome the issue and estimate sample 
size adjusted critical values for t statistics: 
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כݐ = ൣ(ܶ െ ݇)൫ܶଵ/் െ 1൯൧ଵ/ଶ (6) 
where T is the sample size; k measure the number of estimated parameters. The null 
hypothesis is the posterior probability, which is the statistical probability that a ypothesis is 
true computed in the light of relevant observations. We implement large-sample adjustments 
to the critical t-values in order to avoid overstatement of statistical significance. If a 
calculated test statistic exceeds the appropriate critical value from Equation 6, the sample 
evidence is said to favor the alternative hypothesis. Fir t, in order to evaluate statistically the 
forecasting abilities of HFTs and institutional investors, we estimate th  Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE), the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE). For all three of the error statistics retained, the lower the output, the better the 
forecasting accuracy of the model: 




ܧܣܯ = ൬1݊൰ ෍ | ఛܻ െ ௧ܻ|௧ା௡ఛୀ௧ାଵ  (8) 
 
ܧܲܣܯ = 1݊ ෍ ฬ ఛܻ െ ௧ܻ௧ܻ ฬ௧ା௡ఛୀ௧ାଵ  (9) 
where ܻ ௧ represents the actual values of the price of the E-Mini S&P 500;  ܻ ఛ is the forecasted 
values of the price of  the E-Mini S&P 500. When difference between actual and forecasted 
values of the price of the E-mini S&P 500 is far off, RMSE, MAE and MAPE are bigger 
values and therefore the forecasts are less accurate. A direct forecasting comparison between 
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HFTs and institutional traders indicate the superiority of the former. The RMSE, MAand 
MAPE for HFTs are significantly smaller than the errors produced by institutional traders 
(Table 5).  
Table 5 illustrate that the HFTs presents the best statistical results in all four months under 
investigation for the E-Mini S&P 500.  HFT scalping strategies trading theE-Mini S&P 500 
in August, 2014 outperform the other three months measured by the lowest forecasting errors. 
We compute the modified Diebold-Mariano (MDM) test, which is an extension of the 
Diebold and Mariano [12], test to verify the statistical significance of the above analysis. 
Under the null hypothesis of the test is the equivalence in forecasting accuracy between 
several models: 
ܯܦܯ = ܶିଵ/ଶ[ܶ + 1െ 2݇ + ܶିଵ݇(݇ െ 1)]ଵ/ଶ10) ܯܦ) 
where ܶ  represents the number millisecond trading messages for the E-Mini S&P 500 in 
February, 2014; May, 2014; August, 2014; and November, 2014; ݇ the number of the one-
step-ahead forecasts; DM represents the Diebold-Mariano test which compares the forecast 
accuracy of two forecast methods. The null hypothesis under the test is that they have the 
same forecast accuracy. A negative value of the MDM test suggests that the first forecast is 
more accurate than the second forecast. We apply the MDM test to measure the predictive 
abilities of HFTs vs. institutional traders.  
The test measures each period with student distribution of T-1 degrees of freedom (MSE and 
MAE are used as loss functions). Table 6 presents the statistics for the four months under 
investigation, comparing the performance of HFTs with institutional traders. Table 6 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the modified Diebold-Mariano test of equal forecasting 
accuracy has been rejected for all comparisons and for both loss functions at the 1% lev l of 
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significance. Moreover, the statistical superiority performance of HFTs’ strategies is 
confirmed by the negative values of the MDM statistic for both loss functions.  
The RMSE, MAE and MAPE are all important error measures, yet they may not corresp nd 
to profits. We therefore calculate the daily profits generated by HFTs and institutional traders 
for the most traded five days in each month (full trading volume reported in Appendix B).  
Daily profits for each market participant, ݅, are estimated for each trading day, ݐ, based on 
marked-to-market accounting, taking into consideration the fact that every HFT and 
institutional trader begins each trading day with a zero inventory position.  
Baron et al. [2] suggest that a marking-to-market modelling mechanism is an appropriate 
profit measuring tool for market participants who end the trading day with a zero inv ntory. 
We estimate the end of the day profits for both artificial trading groups as the cumulative 
cash received from selling short positions minus the cash gained from buying long positions, 
plus the value of any outstanding positions at the end of the trading day, marked to the market 
price of the E-Mini S&P 500 at close of trading:  
௜,௧ߨ = ෍݌௡ݕ௜,௡ே೔,೅௡ୀଵ +  (௜,் (11ݕ்݌
where ݊ = ڮ,1 , ௜ܰ,் denotes the trades for trader ݅ f om the start of the trading day to the 
end of the trading day; ݌௡ represents the price of the trade; ݕ௜,௡ measures the quantity of the 
n-th trade generated by trader ݅; ݕ்݌௜,் is the value of any outstanding positions at the end of 
the day. Transaction costs of $0.20 per contract are taken into account. Table 7 shows that 
HFTs generate significantly higher profits than institutional traders for the E-Mini S&P 500 
in all four months.  
We observe that HFTs’ profits are higher due to their higher speed friction ߛ. Here, higher ߛ 
means more severe HFTs’ front-running. Li [30] defines the speed friction as: 
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where Ƚ௝ = ௡ೕ௡ೕశభ is the equilibrium fast trading intensity for all ݆. The speed friction is not 
affected by the other parameters and is determined entirely on the fast traders’ spe d profile ൛݊ଵ,݊ଶ,ڮ , ௝݊ൟ. The profits of HFTs come from the price impact of institutional trades in our 
artificial futures market. This finding is consistent with Baron et al. [2], who claim that 
trading the E-Mini S&P 500 is a zero-sum gain: one trader’s profit comes directly at the 
expense of another trader. Furthermore, Li [30] argues that in the presence of more 
fundamental uncertainty, the price impact of trades is higher and front-running an order is 
more profitable. At the same time when there is more noise trading on the market, the trading 
volume is higher and there are more trading orders available for front-running.    
While HFT scalping strategies are very profitable, they might carry some risk on a day-to-day 
basis. The standard deviation of the profits (Table 8) reports a wide variety of different 
values, with the highest variation of profits ($391) generated by HFTs in August, 2014. We 
estimate the probability of default for both groups of traders as an arithmetic Brownian 
motion with constant drift ߙ and constant volatility ߪ. Considering the fact that the daily 
profits for August, 2014 are normally distributed with mean ߙ = $391, standard deviation ߪ = $7.50, and the initial wealth
 
( ଴ܸ) of all artificial traders is $100,000, we can estimate the 
probability of HFTs’ default in August by implementing the following formula based on the 
theory of hitting times by Karlin and Taylor [26].   
(ݐ݈ݑ݂ܽ݁݀)݌ = exp ൬െ2ߙ ଴ܸߪଶ ൰ (13) 
By calibrating Equation (13) to the values of ߙ, ܸ ଶ, andߪ ଴ listed in Table 8, we find that 
HFTs’ probability of default is virtually zero.  
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Although trading profits reported in Table 7 give us an idea of the real magnitude of HFTs’ 
profits, risk-adjusted performance is of prime importance. The monthly Sharpe ratio for HFTs 
and institutional traders has been calculated as: 
ܴܵ௜,௧ = ௜,௧ݎ െ ௜ߪ௙ݎ כ ඥ252/12 (14) 
where ݎ௜,௧ represents the average daily return estimated from the daily profit;  ௜ is theߪ 
standard deviation of trader ݅Ԣݏ return over the sample period; ݎ௙ is the risk-free rate set at the 
value of the daily continuously compounded rate converted from the annualised investment 
yield on a one-month US Treasury bill (data up to 31st December, 2014 has been downloaded 
from the Federal Reserve statistical release website at www.federalreserve.gov/eleases/h15). 
Table 9 illustrates that HFTs have the highest risk-return tradeoff, generating a Sharpe ratio 
of 1.99 in August, 2014. Hence, we conclude that while HFTs bear some minimum risk, their 
risk-adjusted returns are much higher than institutional traders within artificial futures market 
settings.  
To examine the trading horizon of HFTs in the most profitable month, we follow Hasbrouck 
and Sofianos [23] and decompose their profits in August, 2014 (based on most traded fiv  
days) over different time frames by applying spectral analysis. The timefra  over which 
HFTs generate their profits provides more specific details about their trading strategies. 
Spectral analysis view marked-to-market profits as a function of two different time series 
such as prices and the level of inventory, which can vary at different frequencies.  
Similar to Baron et al. [2], we implement Fourier analysis to decompose prices and 
inventories into groups of different frequencies. In the case when the two time ser es, prices 
and inventories are in the same phase (HFTs buy before the price of the E-Mini S&P 500 
increases) they generate profits. If the two time series are not in a phase (HFTs buy before the 
23 | P a g e  
 
price of the E-Mini S&P 500 decreases) they experience losses. Marked-to-market profits for 
HFTs can be expressed as:   
ఛߨ = ෍ ௧݌)௧ݔ െ (௧ିଵ݌ = ෍ ௧ݔ ή ο݌௧ఛ௧ୀ଴ఛ௧ୀ଴  (15) 
where ݔ௧ represents the inventory holdings of HFTs at time ݐ and ݌௧ is the price of E-Mini 
S&P 500 at time ݐ. One of the requirements of the spectral analysis is the stationarity of ݔ௧ 
and ο݌௧. This requirement has been satisfied because HFTs’ inventories (ݔ௧) is a mean-
reverting process and the first difference of the prices process denoted as ο݌ is a martingale 
difference sequence. We follow Baron et al. [2] and develop the following two functions: 
෍(߱)ݔ ௧݁ଶగ௜௧ఠ/்௧்ୀ଴ݔ  (16) 
ο݌(߱) = ෍ ο݌௧ାଵ݁ଶగ௜௧ఠ/்௧்ୀ଴   (17) 
where ߱  represents the frequency of different groups; ݔො(߱) and ο݌(߱)
 
are the two spectral 
densities of the ݔ௧ and ݌௧. We apply Fourier analysis to Equation (17) and obtain the 
following: 
்ߨ = 1ܶ෍ ො(߱)ஶఠୀଵݔ ο݌(߱) = 1ܶ෍ 2 כ ஶఠୀଵ((߱)݌ො(߱)οݔ)݈ܴܽ݁  (18) 
Where, Real represents a function that takes a real part in a complex number; 2  is the component of the marked-to-market profits generated by HFTs at ((߱)݌ො(߱)οݔ)݈ܴܽ݁כ
frequency ߱ . The second equality in Equation (18) is a result based on the fact that an 
imaginary part of ݔො(߱)ο݌(߱) is equal to zero.   
Table 10 shows that in August, 2014 HFTs make the largest profits of $630 at the very short 
interval between 0 and 50 milliseconds and the smallest profits of $42 at the longest time 
scale between 3,501 and 4,000 milliseconds. Therefore, the HFTs do not try to infer the long-
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term fundamental value of the E-Mini S&P 500 but emphasize entirely on capturing short-
term price dynamics. We have found that HFTs’ profits are not determined by the difference 
between their entry price and the fundamental value of the three assets, but by the difference 
between their entry and exit prices.  
The results of spectral analysis are consistent with the notion that HFTs generate profits by 
anticipating and front-running the order flow. Narang [36] have estimated that front-running 
generates $1.5 to $3 billion in annual profits for HFTs in the US equity market alone. To 
examine the actual persistence of HFTs’ profits in August 2014, we investigate whether 
profits from a previous day’s trading are a good predictor of the current day’s profit . This is 
an important robust exercise because persistent profits distributed over time indicate that 
HFTs will extend their strong performance in the future at the expense of institutional traders.  
Baron et al. [2] propose the following OLS regression which we implement in our 
examination for persistence of HFTs’ profits: 
௜,௧ݐ݂݅݋ݎܲ = ߙ + ௜,௧ିଵݐ݂݅݋ݎଵܲߚ + ௜,௦ݏݏ݁݊݁ݒ݅ݏݏ݁ݎ݃݃ܣଶߚ + ௜,௧݁݉ݑ݈݋ଷܸߚ
+ ௦,௧ݕݐ݈݅݅ݐ݈ܽ݋ସܸߚ +  (௜,௧ (19ߝ
where ܲ (ݏݐ݂݅݋ݎ݌)݊݃݅ݏ ௜,௧ represents modified log profits such asݐ݂݅݋ݎ כ log (1 +  (|ݏݐ݂݅݋ݎ݌|
to incorporate any negative profits;  ܸ݁݉ݑ݈݋௜,௧ is the log of each artificial trader’s trading 
volume for day ݁݉ݑ݈݋ܸ ;ݐ௜,௧ denotes the price volatility for day ݐ defined as the volume-
weighted standard deviation of the price process for the same day; ݏݏ݁݊݁ݒ݅ݏݏ݁ݎ݃݃ܣ௜,௦ 
represents the trader ݅Ԣݏ volume-weighted aggressiveness ratio. The univariate results for the 
HFTs’ profits in August, 2014 (Table 11) reveal statistical significance indicating that one-
day lagged performance is a good predictor of the current day’s performance. Similarly, the 
statistical significance of the control variables ܸ݁݉ݑ݈݋௜,௧, ܸ  ௜,௦ demonstrates the persistence of HFTs’ profitability because theݏݏ݁݊݁ݒ݅ݏݏ݁ݎ݃݃ܣ ௦,௧ andݕݐ݈݅݅ݐ݈ܽ݋
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specification with control variables maintains the statistical significance from the univariate 
regression results.  This finding indicates that profitability is persistent even after controlling 
for time effects. This is in line with the findings of Baron et al.[2] but opposite to Chae t al. 
[7], who point out that algorithmic traders incur losses by trading.  
The ever-increasing demand for speed and technological improvements creates an arms race 
issue and raises questions whether the speed of incorporating information into the market at 
the millisecond timeframe has any social value. In 2010, an American company named 
Spread Networks invested $300 million in a new high-speed fiber optic cable in order to 
reduce round-trip communication time between New York and Chicago from 16 milliseconds 
to 13 milliseconds. In 2015, several HFT companies invested in microwaves rather than fiber 
optic cable due to the fact that the light travels faster through air than glass. The new 
microwave technology helps decreasing transmission time from 13 milliseconds to 8.1 
milliseconds. Similar speed races in financial markets occur on a regular basis, often 
measured at microsecond (millionth of a second) and even nanosecond (billionth of a second) 
timeframes. As a benchmark to this superhuman speed of trading we would like to highlight 
that the blink of a human eye lasts approximately 400 milliseconds. Delaney [11] uses 
techniques from real options analysis to provide insights into the optimal time traders should 
invest in high frequency technologies. From a social welfare perspective, in order to be 
socially optimal, traders should wait longer when the cost of technology is very high and the 
level of and HFT is also high. Furthermore, the author shows that the level of HFT always 
exceeds the socially optimal welfare level.  
Biais et al. [3] provide an analysis of the implications of a Pigovian tax (a tax applied to 
market activity that is generating negative externalities) on HFT and demonstrate that the 
socially optimal level of HFT would be reached if the tax imposed is equal to the externalities 
generated by HFT. On 6th of May, 2010 the front-month of June E-Mini S&P 500 
26 | P a g e  
 
experienced dramatic decline of 5.1% within a 13 minute period. A cascade of ex cuted 
orders decreased further the price of the E-Mini S&P 500 to 6.4%. The next executed order 
triggered the CME Globex Stop Logic Functionality, which pauses execution of all orders for 
5 seconds, if the next transaction were to execute outside the price range of 6 index poits. 
During this pause of 5 seconds (named the ‘Reserve State’) the market is still open and 
market participants are allowed to submit, modify or cancel trading orders. However, 
execution of pending trading orders is delayed until actual trading resumes after 5 seconds.   
To mitigate the negative consequences of HFTs and eliminate front-running, we propose the 
following regulatory measures. First, based on our empirical findings, we propose a c oling-
off period of less than 50 milliseconds rather than ‘Reserve State’ of 5 seconds6. The current 
regulatory debates include a cooling-off period of 500 milliseconds. To minimize the number 
of cancelled orders, market regulators worldwide are currently discussing a o-called 
minimum resting trading order period. This would require an order to stay on an order book 
for 500 milliseconds eliminating traders who operate at much faster speeds.  However, both 
the proposed minimum resting trading order period of 500 milliseconds and the current
‘Reserve State’ practice of 5 seconds does not seem to be efficient when compared to our 
empirical findings.  
Robustness checks.   
To examine the robustness of our empirical findings we modified some of the artificial 
market parameters. Panel A of Table 12 shows the rate of cancellation and execution of limit 
orders by 10,000 HFTs (10% of the total population, genome depth of 10 and genome size of 
2,048) and 90,000 institutional investors (90% of the total population, genome depth of 10 
                                                          
6 Our policy recommendation isbased on trading orders executed at the millisecond interval only. With recent 
technological improvements in software and hardware trading orders are executed at the microsecond and even 
nanosecond intervals. Therefore our policy recommendation may not beeffici nt at these timeframes.  
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and genome size of 2,048). The probability of cancellation within 50 milliseconds, 
஼ܲ௔௡௖௘௟(50) is 0.702, compared to the probability of cancellation of 0.918 in a market 
populated with 20,000 HFTs and 80,000 institutional investors.  
Panel B of Table 12 illustrate the rate of cancellation and execution of limit orders by 40,000 
HFTs (40% of the total population, genome depth of 40 and genome size of 8,192) and 
60,000 institutional investors (60% of the total population, genome depth of 40 and genome 
size of 8,192). The probability of cancellation within 50 milliseconds in this case is 0.994, 
compared to the probability of cancellation of 0.918 in a market populated with 20,000 HFTs 
and 80,000 institutional investors. 
Our robustness profitability checks in Table 13 suggest that reduced number of HFTs (10% 
of the total population) operating in the artificial futures market is leading to decreased 
profitability in all four front-months of the E-Mini S&P 500 in 2014. We observed increased 
profitability in all front-months under investigation when we introduced more HFTs to the 
market. Our profit-based estimations in Table 14 shows that the greate  the number of HFTs 
in the market, the higher the profits.  These findings indicate that greater presence of HFTs in 
the market is leading to cancellations of larger proportions of trading orders and greater 
profitability. This is in line with our initial empirical results.  
Conclusions 
Rapid improvements in the technological base for generating and executing tradorders 
dramatically increased the speed and sophistication of the trading tools available to market 
participants. Making an accurate bid or ask call in the futures markets is no longer a sufficient 
condition for generating profits. Determining a fast-moving opportunity in front of the other 
market participants seems to have the greatest influence. However, the practice of computers 
running futures markets raised concerns among investors and regulators around the world.  
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In this study, we simulate real-life trading within artificial futures market settings and observe 
that HFTs generate a large number of cancelled orders within 50 milliseconds which may 
make trading more difficult and costly for institutional traders who lack access to 
sophisticated software platforms for HFT. We have found that HFTs are a major user of very 
short duration orders that are frequently cancelled from inside or at the best quotes. This 
particular trading behaviour reduces the certainty of execution and imposes trading obstacles 
for institutional traders by making the price of the E-Mini S&P 500 more transient. A direct 
forecasting comparison between HFTs and institutional traders indicate the superiority of the 
former. Our spectral analysis confirms that HFTs generate profits by front-running the order 
flow. If one group of market participants such as HFTs generates faster access to the order 
flow than institutional traders, those participants with their lower latency would have an 
unfair advantage in the marketplace. Overall, a high level of cancelled ord rs combined with 
scalping strategies could impose severe picking-off risks for undisclosed trading orders and 
may make them very inefficient.  
In terms of market regulation, we think that the introduction of a minimum resting trading 
order period of less than 50 milliseconds could impose an obstacle for profit generation of 
HFTs. Minimum resting trading order period of less than 50 milliseconds could lead to HFTs 
facing a queuing risk resulting in a less harmful market quality effect. One practical 
implication of our study is that we demonstrate thatm rket regulators can apply artificial 
intelligence tools such as STGP to conduct trading behaviour-based profiling. This can be
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                                                               Appendices 
                                                             Artificial stock market parameters 
Total population size (traders)  100,0000 
HFTs’ size(percentage of the total population) 20% 
Initial wealth(equal for all traders) 100,000 
Transaction costs $0.20 per contract 
Significant Forecasting range 0% to 10% 
Number of decimal places to round quotes on 
importing 
2 
Minimum price increment for prices generated by 
model 
0.01 
Minimum position unit 20% 
Maximum genome size 4096* 
Maximum genome depth 20**  
Minimum initial genome depth 2 
Maximum initial genome depth 5 
Breeding cycle frequency (quotes) 1 
Minimum breeding age (quotes) 80***  
Initial selection type random 
Parent selection (percentage of initial selection that 
will breed) 
5%****  
Mutation probability (per offspring)  10% 
Total number of millisecond quotes processed- E-
Mini S&P 500, February, 2014 
18,655,490 
Total number of millisecond quotes processed- E-
Mini S&P 500, May, 2014 
22,878,525 
Total number of millisecond quotes processed- E-
Mini S&P 500, August, 2014 
27,368,175 
Total number of millisecond quotes processed-E-
Mini S&P 500, November,2014 
16,282,009 
Creation of unique genomes Yes 
Offspring will replace the worst performing traders 
of the initial selection  
Yes 
 
* Maximum genome size measure the total number of nodes in a trader’s trading rule. A node is a gene in the 
genome such as a function or a value.  
**  Maximum genome depth measures the highest number of hierarchical levels that occurs in a trader’s genome 
(trading rule). The depth of a trading rule can be an indicator of its complexity.  
***  This is the minimum age required for agents to qualify for potential participation in the initial selection. The 
age of a trader is represented by the number of quotes that have been processed since the trader was created. 
This measure also specifies the period over which agent performance will b compared. Our minimum breeding 
age is set to 80, which means that the trader’s performance over the last 80 quo es will be compared.   
 
****  5% of the best performing traders of the initial selection that will act as parents in crossover operations for 
creating new traders.  
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Time (milliseconds) Cancellation Execution 
                                                                                                          HFTs
                  0-50 0.918 0.069 
                51-100 0.824 0.040 
                101-200 0.667 0.023 
                201-300 0.211 0.017 
                301-500 0.056 0.005 
                                                                                            Institutional traders  
                   0-50 0.001 0.016 
                 51-100 0.014 0.099 
                101-200 0.018 0.174 
                201-300 0.021 0.388 
                301-500 0.028 0.779 
This table presents cumulative probabilities of cancellation and execution within the millisecond interval. Data has been generated and 
extracted from the STGP trading algorithm for the front-month of the E-Mini S&P 500 (February, 2014; May, 2014; August, 2015 and 
November, 2014). The probabilities are estimated as 1 െ ܵ where ,(ݐ)ܵ  represent the survival function of cancellation and execution. In (ݐ)
order to calculate the survival function we extracted all trading activity for E-Mini 500 S&P 500 generated by STGP trading algorithm and 
used the life-table method.   
Table 2. The rate of cancellation and execution of limit orders by HFTs and institutional traders 
generated by STGP trading algorithm for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-month (February, 2014; May, 




                                                                                 Cancellations with durations ≤ 50 milliseconds  
                                                                                                            HFTs
Order location Percentage of orders 
Inside best 71.24* 
At best 18.49* 
                                                                                                Institutional traders  
Inside best 28.31* 
At best 8.10* 
This table reports the location and percentage of cancelled limit orders by HFTs and institutional traders for E-Mini S&P 500. The 
significance of the differences between HFT s and institutional traders are estimated using z-statistics for comparing two proportions. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.   
Table 3. Location of cancelled limit orders (≤50 milliseconds) generated by STGP trading algorithm 
for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-month (February, 2014; May, 2014; August, 2014 and November, 
2014).  
 
                                                                              Cancellations with durations  > 50 milliseconds  
                                                                                                           HFTs
Order location Percentage of orders 
Inside best 63.28* 
At best 15.01* 
                                                                                                   Institutional traders  
Inside best 19.18* 
At best 12.53* 
This table reports the location and percentage of cancelled limit orders by HFTs and institutional traders for E-Mini S&P 500. The 
significance of the differences between HFTs and institutional traders are estimated using z-statistics for comparing two proportions. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.   
Table 4. Location of cancelled limit orders (> 50 milliseconds) generated by STGP trading algorithm 
for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-month (February, 2014; May, 2014; August, 2014 and November, 
2014).  
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Forecasting error RMSE MAE  MAPE 
                                                                                        February 2014 
HFTs 0.0008 0.0007 14.21% 
Institutional traders  0.0029 0.0025 44.17% 
                                                                                           May 2014 
HFTs 0.0009 0.0006 19.88% 
Institutional traders  0.0037 0.0031 38.24% 
                                                                                          August 2014 
HFTs 0.0005 0.0003 10.06% 
Institutional traders  0.0027 0.0022 47.99% 
                                                                                        November 2014 
HFTs 0.0010 0.0008 20.11% 
Institutional traders  0.0039 0.0020 49.57% 
 
Table 5. Summary of HFTs and institutional traders forecasting statistical performance of the E-Mini 





Diebold-Mariano MDM 1 MDM 2 
                                                                                   February 2014 
Institutional traders  -9.14* -10.07* 
                                                                                       May 2014 
Institutional traders  -8.63* -9.99* 
                                                                                     August 2014 
Institutional traders  -4.22* -5.78* 
                                                                                   November 2014 
Institutional traders  -7.54* -8.10* 
MDM 1 and MDM 2 are the statistics estimated for the MSE and MAE loss functions. While MSE and MAE are used as loss 
functions, the modified Diebold-Mariano (MDM) test follows the student distribution with T-1 degrees of freedom. The 
table represents the application of the MDM test to the two forecasting models: HFT  vs. institutional traders. Negative 
values of the MDM test suggest that the first forecasting model (HFTs) is more accurate than the second model. The lower 
the negative value the more accurate are the HFTs’ forecasts. * indicates rejection of the MDM null hypothesis of equal 
forecasting accuracy.    
Table 6. Summary results of modified Diebold-Mariano statistics for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-
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Date HFTs Institutional traders  
                                                                                                         February 2014 
05/02/2014 $317 $26 
11/02/2014 $303 $47 
19/02/2014 $299 $33 
21/02/2014 $300 $30 
27/02/2014 $289 $29 
                                                                                                              May 2014 
01/05/2014 $287 $22 
08/05/2014 $280 $20 
09/05/2014 $301 $29 
15/05/2014 $293 $34 
19/05/2014 $299 $28 
                                                                                                             August 2014 
04/08/2014 $390 $30 
12/08/2014 $397 $32 
21/08/2014 $386 $23 
26/08/2014 $381 $31 
28/08/2014 $399 $35 
                                                                                                            November 2014 
06/11/2014 $251 $20 
12/11/2014 $247 $19 
20/11/2014 $238 $23 
24/11/2014 $240 $18 
25/11/2014 $233 $25 
This table reports the daily profits by HFTs and institutional traders. All daily profits are estimated as the difference between the prices at 
which HFTs and institutional traders bought and sold shares of E-Mini S&P 500. We follow Baron et al. [4]: 
௜,௧ߨ = ෍݌௡ݕ௜,௡ + ௜,்ே೔,೅௡ୀଵݕ்݌  
where ݊ = 1,  , ௜ܰ,் denotes the trades for trader ݅ f om the start of the trading day  to the end of the trading day; ݌௡ represent the price of 
the trade; ݕ௜,௡ measure the quantity of the n-th trade generated by trader  ݅; ݕ்݌௜,் is the value of any outstanding positions at the end of the 
day. Transaction costs of$0.20 per contract are taken into account.   
 
Table 7. Daily profits based on the most traded five days in each month by HFTs and institutional 
traders generated by STGP trading algorithm for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-month (February, 2014; 
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Statistics HFTs Institutional traders  
                                                                                                       February 2014 
Mean $301*** $33***  
Median $300 $30 
Standard Deviation $10.09 $8.21 
Skewness 0.44 1.16 
Kurtosis 2.46 2.82 
                                                                                                          May 2014 
Mean $292*** $27***  
Median $293 $28 
Standard Deviation $8.66 $5.64 
Skewness -0.33 0.06 
Kurtosis 1.68 1.66 
                                                                                                       August 2014 
Mean $391*** $33***  
Median $390 $32 
Standard Deviation $7.50 $1.92 
Skewness -0.08 0.39 
Kurtosis 1.54 1.99 
                                                                                                      November 2014 
Mean $242*** $21***  
Median $240 $20 
Standard Deviation $7.19 $2.91 
Skewness 0.13 0.41 
Kurtosis 1.65 1.60 
***  indicates that the mean profit value is statistically different from zero. 
Table 8. Distribution of profits by HFTs and institutional traders generated by STGP trading 
algorithm for the E-Mini S&P 500 (based on most traded five days in each month).  
 
 
Month HFTs Institutional traders 
February 2014 1.52 0.61 
May 2014 1.43 0.59 
August 2014 1.99 0.75 
November 2014 1.27 0.57 
 
Table 9. Monthly Sharpe ratios of the E-Mini S&P 500 generated by STGP trading algorithm for 
HFTs and institutional traders (based on most traded five days in each month).  
  













This table examines trading profits over different time lengths for the most traded days in August, 2014 for E-Mini S&P 500, implementing 
the methods of Hasbrouck and Sofianos [6].   
Table 10. Spectral analysis associated with HFTs’ trading profits for the most traded five days in the 
most profitable month (August, 2014) for the E-Mini S&P 500.   
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                                                                                   Univariate regressions  
Variables HFTs’ profits in August 2014 
Profit i,t 0.19* 
                                                                                    Control variables  
Aggressivenessi,s 1.589* 
Volumei,t  0.903* 
Volatility s,t 0.409** 
R2adj 0.09 
This table examines the consistency of HFTs’ profits in August 2014 by investigating whether HFTs’ profit yesterday is a 
good predictor for their profits today. We use the following OLS regression: ܲݐ݂݅݋ݎ௜,௧ = ߙ + ௜,௧ିଵݐ݂݅݋ݎଵܲߚ + ௜,௦ݏݏ݁݊݁ݒ݅ݏݏ݁ݎ݃݃ܣଶߚ + ௜,௧݁݉ݑ݈݋ଷܸߚ + ௦,௧ݕݐ݈݅݅ݐ݈ܽ݋ସܸߚ +  ௜,௧ߝ
where ܲ (ݏݐ݂݅݋ݎ݌)݊݃݅ݏ ௜,௧ represent modified log profits such asݐ݂݅݋ݎ כ log (1 +  to incorporate any negative (|ݏݐ݂݅݋ݎ݌|
profits;  ܸ  ௦,௧ denote the price volatility forݕݐ݈݅݅ݐ݈ܽ݋ܸ ;ݐ ௜,௧ is the log of each artificial trader’s trading volume for day݁݉ݑ݈݋
day ݐ defined as the volume-weighted standard deviation of the price process for the same day; ݏݏ݁݊݁ݒ݅ݏݏ݁ݎ݃݃ܣ௜,௦ represent 
the trader ݅Ԣݏ volume – weighted aggressiveness ratio. * indicates significance at the 1% level; **  indicates significance at 
the 5% level.  
Table 11. Consistency of HFTs profits for the E-Mini S&P 500 in the most profitable month (August 




Panel A* Cancellation Execution 
Time (milliseconds)                                                                       HFTs 
                  0-50 0.702 0.283 
                51-100 0.688 0.133 
               101-200 0.619 0.101 
               201-300 0.322 0.047 
               301-500 0.099 0.015 
                                                      Institutional investors 
                 0-50 0.009 0.221 
               51-100 0.038 0.255 
              101-200 0.066 0.317 
              201-300 0.080 0.509 
              301-500 0.089 0.822 
Panel B**                                                                      HFTs 
                0-50 0.994 0.011 
              51-100 0.873 0.010 
             101-200 0.698 0.007 
             201-300 0.295 0.004 
             301-500 0.085 0.001 
                                                     Institutional investors  
               0-50 0.001 0.010 
             51-100 0.006 0.037 
            101-200 0.015 0.061 
            201-300 0.020 0.080 
            301-500 0.026 0.093 
* Panel A shows the rate of cancellation and execution of limit orders by 10,000 HFTs (10% of the total population, genome depth of 10 and 
genome size of 2,048) and 90,000 institutional investors (90% of the to al population, genome depth of 10 and genome size of 2,048). ** 
Panel B shows the rate of cancellation and execution of limit orders by 40,000 HFTs (40% of the total population, genome depth of 40 and 
genome size of 8,192) and  60,000 institutional investors (60% of the total population, genome depth of 40 and genome size of 8,192). 
Millisecond data has been generated and extracted from the STGP trading algorithm for the front-month of the E-Mini S&P 500 (February, 
2014; May, 2014; August, 2015 and November, 2014). The probabilities are estimated as1െ ܵ where ,(ݐ)ܵ  represents the survival (ݐ)
function of cancellation and execution. In order to calculate the survival function we extracted all trading activity for E-Mini 500 S&P 500 
generated by STGP trading algorithm and used the life-table method.   
Table 12. Robustness checks related to the rate of cancellation and execution of limit rders by HFTs 
and institutional traders generated by STGP trading algorithm for the E-Mini S&P 500’s front-month 
(February, 2014; May, 2014; August, 2014 and November, 2014).   
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Date HFTs Institutional traders  
                                                                                                         February 2014 
05/02/2014 $203 $31 
11/02/2014 $184 $55 
19/02/2014 $155 $42 
21/02/2014 $190 $44 
27/02/2014 $172 $37 
                                                                                                              May 2014 
01/05/2014 $124 $35 
08/05/2014 $138 $26 
09/05/2014 $166 $38 
15/05/2014 $199 $42 
19/05/2014 $201 $40 
                                                                                                             August 2014 
04/08/2014 $257 $51 
12/08/2014 $244 $64 
21/08/2014 $218 $43 
26/08/2014 $248 $50 
28/08/2014 $261 $72 
                                                                                                            November 2014 
06/11/2014 $111 $23 
12/11/2014 $122 $27 
20/11/2014 $103 $30 
24/11/2014 $100 $22 
25/11/2014 $119 $41 
All daily profits are estimated as the difference between th  prices at which HFTs and institutional traders bought and sold shares of E-Mini 
S&P 500. We follow Baron et al. [4]: 
௜,௧ߨ = ෍݌௡ݕ௜,௡ + ௜,்ே೔,೅௡ୀଵݕ்݌  
where  ݊ = 1,  , ௜ܰ,் denotes the trades for trader ݅ f om the start of the trading day  to the end of the trading day; ݌௡ represent the price of 
the trade; ݕ௜,௡ measure the quantity of the n-th trade generated by trader ݅; ݕ்݌௜,் is the value of any outstanding positions at the end of the 
day. Transaction costs of $0.20 per contract are taken into account.   
Table 13. Robustness checks for the E-Mini S&P 500 front-month’s daily profits based on the most 
traded five days in each month by 10,000 HFTs (10% of the total population, genome depth of 10 and 
genome size of 2,048) and 90,000 institutional investors (90% of the total population, gen me depth 
















Date HFTs Institutional traders  
                                                                                                         February 2014 
05/02/2014 $421 $11 
11/02/2014 $399 $34 
19/02/2014 $338 $25 
21/02/2014 $404 $19 
27/02/2014 $316 $20 
                                                                                                              May 2014 
01/05/2014 $330 $12 
08/05/2014 $318 $10 
09/05/2014 $396 $18 
15/05/2014 $411 $26 
19/05/2014 $377 $18 
                                                                                                             August 2014 
04/08/2014 $499 $21 
12/08/2014 $495 $15 
21/08/2014 $481 $14 
26/08/2014 $490 $29 
28/08/2014 $503 $33 
                                                                                                            November 2014 
06/11/2014 $314 $10 
12/11/2014 $306 $12 
20/11/2014 $299 $14 
24/11/2014 $322 $11 
25/11/2014 $315 $23 
All daily profits are estimated as the difference between th  prices at which HFTs and institutional traders bought and sold shares of E-Mini 
S&P 500. We follow Baron et al. [4]: 
௜,௧ߨ = ෍݌௡ݕ௜,௡ + ௜,்ே೔,೅௡ୀଵݕ்݌  
where  ݊ = 1,  , ௜ܰ,் denotes the trades for trader ݅ f om the start of the trading day  to the end of the trading day; ݌௡ represent the price of 
the trade; ݕ௜,௡ measure the quantity of the n-th trade generated by trader ݅; ݕ்݌௜,் is the value of any outstanding positions at the end of the 
day. Transaction costs of $0.20 per contract are taken into account.   
Table 14. Robustness checks for the E-Mini S&P 500 front-month’s daily profits based on the most 
traded five days in each month by 40,000 HFTs (40% of the total population, genome depth of 40 and 
genome size of 8,192) and  60,000 institutional investors (60% of the total population, gen me depth 
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                                                            Appendix A 
                           Genetic Programming and Strongly Typed Genetic Programming 
Although, Schlereth et al. [17] designed agent-based models that provide a promising link to individual 
behaviour, most existing techniques to agent-based system design fail to deal with the complexity of 
design [9]. To address this issue, we implement the Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP). The 
STGP is a more sophisticated version of Genetic Programming (GP) whose application of generic 
functions and data types makes it more sophisticated than GP. GP can be considered an extension of 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs). GAs are techniques based on evolution and natural selection [16]. Under 
GAs’ approach the economy is seen as evolving complex system in which artificial traders perform the 
activities of the real-life economy [19]. The procedure enhances search output by performing different 
solutions with genetic operators [11]. A benefit of GP over traditional GA is that players evolve not just 
the values of variables but also the structure of their models [5]. GP represents a machine-learning 
method to automate the development of computer programs in terms of natural evolution [2], which 
works by defining a goal in the form of quality criterion [1]. If there are inputs ܺ and outputs ܻ, a 
program ݌ is generated which satisfies ܻ = GP uses variable-l .(ܺ)݌ ngth tree structures for 
representing candidate solutions [20]. Opposite to neural networks, decision-tree structures represent 
specific rules that can be expressed in English [10]. The leaf nodes of the tree are the terminals whereas 
the non-leaf nodes are known as non-terminals. Terminals are usually inputs to the program with no 
argument and the non-terminals are functions often represented with at least one argument. Th  parse 
trees represent the trading rules of 20,000 HFTs and 80,000 institutional traders in our experiment. The 
typical genetic structure of the trading rule consists of hundreds of nodes an  i  rather unwieldy to 








Figure 1. Example of time – dependent trading rule for institutional traders.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the trading rule for institutional trders sends a buy signal if the average futures 
price over the past 1 millisecond is greater than the current price. A sell signa is sent otherwise. 
Institutional traders do not momentarily perform best in terms of the continu us Breeding Fitness 
Return, and therefore they possess higher latency in trading operations. Therefore, they are unable to 
foresee the quotes of the E-Mini S&P 500 and submit trading orders before HFTs. 
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Figure 2. Example of time-dependent trading rule for HFTs. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the trading rule of HFTs sends a buy signal if the average futures price over the 
past 1 millisecond is greater than the current price and the current volume is less than 500. A sell signal 
is sent otherwise. The current volume function protects HFTs from sweep risk exposure. Large losses 
caused by sweeps (adverse price movements against HFTs’ transient positions) can substantially reduce 
or even eliminate their profitability, so the management of sweep risk is of paramount importance for 
HFTs. HFTs use the market microstructure to capture and avoid sweep risk, which is t e risk related to 
trading against large informed toxic orders (for instance, large institutional orders) positioned at 
multiple levels of the order book.  
 
The main steps in developing a genetic program are as follows: 
1. Create initial randomly generated population of trading rules (trees). The random generation of 
trees enables the whole range of possible trading rules to be studied. The only requirement for 
trading rules is that they be well defined and produce output appropriate to the problem of 
interest. These trading rules apply the fundamental principles of biol gical evolution to create 
a new and improved population of trading rules. The creation and development of this new 
population is based on a domain-independent system governed by the Darwinian theory of 
natural selection under the principle of survival of the fittest.   
2. Calculate the fitness of each trading rule in the initial population with accordance to appropriate 
criterion.  
3.  Create a new population by implementing the following operations: 
(i) Copy existing traders into the new population (crossover).  
(ii)  Randomly select a pair of existing trading rules and recombine subtrees from them to 
produce a new trading rule (mutation). While crossover mixes subtrees of the 
population, mutation replaces subtrees with new subtrees. The operations of crossover 
and mutation are performed with the probability of selection for the operations, and 
skewed towards selecting traders with higher levels of fitness.   
4. Calculate the fitness of each trader in the new population.  
5. Repeat these operations, recording the overall fittest traders. 
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In the crossover process, randomly selected subtrees are swapped (exchanged). More specifically, a 
crossover point in the tree is randomly selected within each parent. Trading rules are selected on the 
basis of their fitness, with the crossover allocating future trials to areas of the search space whose trading 
rules contain parts from the superior trading rules. The best performing trading rules from the initial 
selection are selected based on the Breeding Fitness Return to act as parents in th  crossover process. 
The Breeding Fitness Return process represents a trailing return of a wealth moving average and is an 
integral part of the latency of HFTs. This is in fact the return over the last ݊ quotes of an exponential 
moving average of a trader’s wealth, where ݊ could potentially have the maximum breeding value of 
250. Each pair of parents generates two offspring trading rules, so the number of parents and the number 
of offspring are equal at all times. In this innovative programming process th  newly created trading 
rules replace those that performed poorly in the initial selection based on the replacement Fitness 
Return. This type of return represents the average return of a wealth moving average per millisecond 
quote since the creation of the very first trading rule. In other words, this is the cumulative return of an 
exponential moving average of a trader’s wealth, divided by the trader’s breeding value.  
 
In the process of mutation a pair of trading rules has been randomly selected from the population, with 
probability weighted in favor of higher fitness trading rules. The subtrees of the two parent rules are 
then randomly selected. One of the selected subtrees is subsequently discarded and replaced by another 
subtree to generate the offspring rule. The GP searches areas of the solution space by evolving a 
population of trading rules, with the trading rules in each successive generatio tending to become adept 
at solving the problem. As full technical explanation of crossover and mutation is beyond the scope of 
this paper, the reader may refer to Koza [12] for more details.    
 
Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) is a version of GP whose application of generic functions 
and data types makes it more sophisticated than GP (in STGP each node is connected to a particular 
return). STGP is specifically suited to optimize structural or functioal form. To create a parse tree, one 
needs to take into account important additional programming criteria such as when the root node of the 
tree returns a value of the type required by the problem, and when each non-root node returns a value 
of the type required by the parent node as an argument [15]. While GP can be written in any 
programming language, the STGP is typically written in a specific programming language, which is a 
combination of Ada [3] and Lisp [18]. The concept of generics as a method of developing strongly 
typed data is the critical component adopted from Ada.  Additionally, Lisp incorporates the concept of 
having programs represented by actual parse trees [14]. While in conventional GP, one needs to specify 
all the programs and variables that can be used as nodes in a parse tree and deal with the search space 
of the order of 1030 - 1040.  STGP however reduces the searching state- pace size to a greater degree 
[13]. On the other hand, the STGP search space composes the set of all legal parse trees, which means 
that all functions have the correct number of parameters of the correct type. On most occasions, the 
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STGP parse tree is limited to a certain maximum depth (Table I illustrates that 20 is the maximum depth 
in the artificial futures markets featured in this study). We set the maximum depth to 20 in order to keep 
the search space finite and manageable, while not allowing the trees to grow t  an extremely large size. 
The critical concepts in STGP are generic functions (a mechanism for specifying a class of functions), 
and the process of assigning generic data types for these functions [8]. STGP has the flexibility to allow 
all variables, constraints, arguments and returned values of any type. The only strict requirement is that 
the type of data for each element has to be specified in the early stage of the programmin  process. The 
resulting initialization process and the various genetic operators associated with it are enabled to create 
syntactically correct trees. Those trees on the other hand are beneficial to the entire programming 
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                                                          Appendix B 
                            E-Mini S&P 500 daily trading volume generated by STGP trading algorithm. 
                                                                                        February 2014 
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